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Shopping for a better deal? Party switching among
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Paul Webb a and Tim Bale b
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ABSTRACT
People who join political parties are motivated primarily, although not
exclusively, by ideological impulses. So, given the often considerable
ideological differences between parties, one might presume that very few
those who later leave one party would be keen to join another. However,
using a comprehensive 2019 survey of British party members, we not only
identify several factors associated with switching parties (being especially
socially liberal or socially authoritarian; being a Brexiteer; being a campaign
activist; working in non-manual occupation; having a university degree; being
a man rather than a woman; being older rather than younger; and being a
current member of one of the country’s smaller political parties), but we also
show, first, the flows between parties and, second, that party switching at the
grassroots is far more common than many imagine. Even so, and
notwithstanding the fact that switching impacts on different parties in
different ways, it is not sufficient to support oft-voiced claims of widespread
entryism into either of Britain’s two main parties – at least on the sort of
scale that might account for Labour’s shift to the liberal-left or the
Conservatives’ shift to supporting a hard Brexit.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 3 March 2021; Accepted 6 June 2021
Introduction
After decades of survey research, we have a fairly good idea of what it is that
leads people to join political parties in the first place (see van Haute and Gauja
2015, 6–9, 193–194). And, while much more work – and certainly much more
work than can be done in a short research note like this one – is needed on
the topic, we are beginning to get some idea of why they decide to leave
them (Bale, Webb, and Poletti 2019, 146–164). Indeed, the reasons for both
enrolling and quitting are similar in the sense that, although it may be not
the be-all and end-all, ideology matters: most of us join a particular party
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primarily because we agree with what it wants to do (and disagree with what
its rivals want to do); most of us who then leave do so mainly because we lose
faith in the direction in which it seems to be heading – something symbolized
perhaps by particular policies or by, say, a change of leader (see Barnfield and
Bale 2020). At the elite level, there is some research on “crossing the floor”,
“party switching” or “party hopping” by legislators (see for example, Heller
and Mershon 2009; O’Brien and Shomer 2013; Morris 2018; Volpi 2019; and
Keaveney 2019) – research that shows that, although inter-party defection
is actually quite rare, it is often ideologically motivated. But what we don’t
know much (if anything) about is the extent to which ordinary grassroots
members who abandon one party go on to become a member of another.
Moreover, why anyone would choose to do so could be seen as something
of a mystery: after all, if someone is enough of an ideologue to join a party,
wouldn’t they, by definition, be relatively immune to the charms of its com-
petitors – especially since (unless perhaps they are a local councillor) they can
hardly be tempted, like some of their parliamentary representatives, to jump
ship purely to try and save their political career?
Yet according to many of those involved in British politics in recent years,
be they active participants or observers, switching parties at the grassroots is
by no means that uncommon. The massive increase in Labour Party member-
ship which accompanied Jeremy Corbyn’s elevation to the leadership in 2015
was often anecdotally associated, at least in the minds of his enemies
(internal as well as external) with “entryism” on the part of people who had
previously belonged to parties on the far-left fringe of the country’s politics
(BBC 2016; but see also Crick 2015 and Pine 2016) or (more charitably,
perhaps, and possibly less anecdotally) to the Greens.1 Meanwhile, the Con-
servative Party’s adoption of an ever harder position on Brexit – a position
that eventually led to the replacement of Theresa May by Boris Johnson
and the defection or ejection of “pro-European” Tory MPs – was blamed by
some (not least by some of those MPs) on entryism on the part of former
members of UKIP (Murphy and Jacobson 2019; Thompson and Sylvester
2019; see also Loucaides 2019 and, for a dollop of scepticism, Wallace 2019).
In view of this, we seek here to make use of a survey of party members con-
ducted immediately after the UK’s 2019 general election to investigate the
following questions: How many current party members have previously
been members of other parties? Between which parties have flows of
members occurred, and when did these flows of membership take place?
1In a write-in section of a survey of party leavers in Britain conducted in 2017 by the Party Members
Project, some 41% of 152 former Green Party members said they had left to join Jeremy Corbyn’s
Labour Party. At best this is only indicative but it is interesting to note that very, very few of the
former members of the Labour Party, the Conservative Party or UKIP who responded to the write-in
question asking them for their reason for leaving explicitly mentioned wanting to join another
party. See Bale, Webb, and Poletti (2019, 158–161).
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What factors seem to motivate such movements? And does the data lend cre-
dence to the various claims of “entryism” that were made in 2019?
Data
In order to answer this question, we surveyed 6823 members of six British
parties (including registered Brexit Party supporters) within two weeks of
the 2019 general election. Some 1478 respondents declared that they had
previously belonged to a party other than the one to which they currently
belonged. The (online) survey was conducted for us by YouGov and
funded by the ESRC. Survey respondents were recruited from a panel of
around several hundred thousand volunteers who are offered a small
reward for completing a survey. Upon joining the panel volunteers are
asked a broad range of demographic questions which are subsequently
used to recruit respondents matching desired demographic quotas for
surveys. Potential respondents for the party members survey were identified
from questions asking respondents if they were members of any of a list of
large membership organizations, including the political parties. Results
reported in this article are not weighted in any way since there are no
known official population parameters for the various party memberships.
However, previous YouGov party membership surveys using unweighted
data have generated predictions for party leadership contests that came
very close to (that is, within just 1% of) the final official outcome, which pro-
vides considerable confidence in the quality of the data.
Results and discussion
Table 1 addresses the first of these questions by revealing that a remarkably
high proportion of our sample claim to have previously been, or currently are,
members of a different political party than the main one to which they are
presently affiliated. Overall, nearly a quarter (23%) fall into this category. As
a robustness check, we examined patterns of members’ movements
between parties using a small British Election Study panel sample from
2015 to 2019, and found that 9% of these respondents moved parties
Table 1. Current party by other party memberships.
Conservative Labour LibDem Brexit/UKIP Green SNP Total
Yes 16.1 16.0 25.8 34.2 30.4 19.6 23.2
No 83.9 84.0 74.2 65.8 69.6 80.4 76.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N= 1191 1377 1044 1112 1023 1038 6785
Notes: Responses to question “Are you currently, or were you previously, a member of any other party?”
All figures = percentages unless otherwise stated. Cramer’s V = .167 (p = .000). Source: Party Members
Project Survey 2019.
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during this period (see Appendix, Table A.1). Given that this was a tenth of
people switched party memberships in just four (admittedly turbulent)
years, it is not surprising that double that proportion would have switched
over the course of their entire political life-times, as our data suggests.
When one weights the amount of switching by the relative sizes of these
parties in 2019, it suggests that as many as 19% of party members at that
time would have been “switchers” – that is, people who had changed party
membership at some point in their lives (see Appendix, Table A.2). In long-
term perspective, this might be a relatively high figure given the extraordi-
nary political tumult of the years surrounding Brexit. Not surprisingly,
perhaps, the Brexit Party’s registered supporters (the party had no
“members” as such) and UKIP members, when considered as a single
entity, were particularly likely to have been members of other parties, with
more than a third claiming that to be the case. In fact, all UKIP members in
our sample also registered as Brexit Party supporters for the 2019 election,
although just 3.7% of BP supporters were also UKIP members. Thus, by late
2019 the overwhelming majority of BP supporters were no longer UKIP
members. Indeed, there are very few UKIP members in our sample at all –
too few to be able to conduct reliable analysis; henceforward, therefore, in
so far as this group of respondents is concerned, we shall focus our analysis
on current BP supporters rather than UKIP members. The Greens also report a
high proportion of other-party memberships (30%); as we shall soon see,
Labour is the most prominent “other party” in question. By contrast, the
two major parties (both of which do their very best to discourage any of
their members belonging to other parties) have the lowest proportions of
other-party memberships amongst their current members.
Table 2 provides detail about the flows of members between all parties. As
suspected, Brexit supporters who had other party memberships chiefly
feature UKIP and Tory members amongst their ranks, some 41% falling into
the former category and 32% into the latter. As a proportion of the total
Table 2. Flows of members between parties.
CURRENT PARTY
FORMER PARTY Conservative Labour LibDem Brexit Green SNP Total
Conservative 0.0 7.9 24.3 31.6 2.3 6.5 14.7
Labour 38.6 0.0 49.8 16.4 61.7 56.7 37.0
Liberal Democrat 8.3 25.2 0.0 4.8 21.9 9.0 11.2
UKIP 28.8 3.5 3.9 40.5 0.6 1.0 14.2
Green 2.3 39.1 5.0 1.3 0.0 8.5 7.9
SNP 0.8 2.0 1.2 0.5 2.3 0.0 1.2
Other 21.2 22.3 15.8 4.8 11.3 18.4 13.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N= 132 202 259 373 311 201 1478
Notes: All figures = percentages unless otherwise stated. Cramer’s V = .390 (p = .000).
Source: Party Members Project Survey 2019.
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number of Brexit Party supporters in our sample (n = 1112), 24% had been
affiliated with UKIP and/or the Conservatives, the remainder being new to
party political involvement.
Just as interesting is the reverse flow of members from BP and UKIP into
the Conservative Party, since this bears directly on some of the claims of
entryism that were heard in the months leading up to the 2019 general elec-
tion. Over half of all Tory members with previous party memberships joined
after 2015, and a third quit their former parties after 2017 and quickly moved
on to the Conservatives in 2018 and 2019. Table 2 reveals that 29% of all Tory
members who admit to having been members of other parties claim to have
been UKIP members; interestingly, though, even more of them (39%) were
former Labour members. Although not shown in Table 2, a further 29% of
current Conservative Party members who admitted another affiliation also
claimed to have been registered Brexit Party supporters at the time of our
survey.
As a proportion of all Conservative Party grassroots members, these
figures amount to 3.2% who were former members of UKIP, 4.5% who
were current Brexit Party supporters, and 4.3% who were ex-Labour
members. This puts into perspective the scale of the entryist phenomenon;
on these figures, around 8% of all Tory members in 2019 had a history of con-
nections with UKIP or the Brexit Party. This is not to say that their impact may
not have been significant in certain constituencies when it came to selecting
party candidates. Nor is it to deny that the Conservative Party grassroots have
increasingly come to favour “hard” forms of Brexit over the course of the past
few years (Bale, Webb, and Poletti 2019, 66–67). But it would appear that in
the vast majority of cases this will largely have been down to the changing
views of those members who have no formal associations with UKIP or the
Brexit Party.
As in the case of the Conservatives, many Labour members (39%) with pre-
vious party memberships joined the party after 2015. Much of this must be
attributed to the effect of Jeremy Corbyn becoming leader of the party in
2015; indeed, it may also have contributed to it (Whiteley et al. 2019).
Those Labour members who have had past lives in other organizations
come mainly from the Green Party or Liberal Democrats – or, intriguingly,
from the amorphous “other parties” category. Our survey did not probe
further into the precise provenance of this latter group, but it is possible
that many of them have had previous connections with far-left organizations
– quite another type of “entryism” to that which the Conservatives have
experienced. It was widely believed that the Green Party haemhorrhaged
support to Labour after the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader in 2015, so
it is no surprise to find that nearly two-fifths of all Labour members with
other party memberships came from the Greens. This amounts to 6% of
the total Labour membership sample. A quarter of those with other party
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affiliations came from the Liberal Democrats, which is to say 4% of all Labour
members, and 22% of Labour’s influx from elsewhere (3% of the total mem-
bership) came from the miscelleaneous but probably leftist “other” organiz-
ations category.
The Liberal Democrats experienced a very significant influx of new
members after the general election reversal of May 2015, and clearly, a sub-
stantial proportion of these individuals had histories of affiliation to other
parties prior to that time. Indeed, around 70% of all Liberal Democrats who
had previously been members of other parties joined after 2015, and two-
thirds of these did so almost immediately after quitting their former party. Vir-
tually a half of all Liberal Democrats with previous party affiliations came from
Labour, while a quarter came from the Tories. These figures amount to
respectively 13% and 6% of the total Liberal Democrat membership.
The smaller parties have experienced high levels of cross-party flows,pro-
portionately speaking. For the Greens, 34% of its members who had quit
another party did so after 2017. Three-fifths of their recruits from other
parties came from Labour and one-fifth from the Liberal Democrats, equal
to 19% and 7% of the total party membership. The SNP is rather less depen-
dent on recent quitters-and-quick-joiners, only 17% of all those with previous
party affiliations (or 3% of the total membership) having left their former
party after 2017 and then joined the Scottish Nationalists. A high proportion
claim to have left their previous party and then joined the SNP prior to 2015
(61.6% of all those with previous party memberships, or 12% of the total
current membership). This most likely reflects the extraordinary mobilizing
impact of the 2014 independence referendum; it is striking that 43% of all
those who had previously been members of other parties joined the SNP
in the 2011–2015 period (ie, 8% of the total current membership). Table 2
reveals that some 57% of all SNP members with previous party affiliations
came from the Labour Party – amounting to 11% of its total membership.
This underlines the extraordinary realignment of Scottish politics over the
course of the past decade, with Labour being replaced by the SNP as the
dominant party north of the border.
So, what drives some people to quit one party and join another – often
very quickly? Although space constraints prevent us from offering a compre-
hensive theory, previous research strongly points to a combination of two
separate theories – one covering why people leave parties and another
why they join parties. People quit largely because of ideological differences
with their parties and negative evaluations of their party leaders (Bale,
Webb, and Poletti 2019, Ch. 8) and they join parties because of a whole
range of factors included in the “general incentives model” of party member-
ship, but especially ideological and expressive ones (Bale, Webb, and Poletti
2019, 76–84). The nature of our data makes it impossible to incorporate these
factors into a single model because we lack contemporaneous measures of
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respondents’ evaluations of their former party leaders and ideological proxi-
mities at the time they quit the first party. However, we can run a more
limited model with our data, with the intention of identifying factors that
might be relevant across time and party, per the logistic regression model
reported in Table 3.
The dependent variable in the model is binary, distinguishing between
respondents who have never been members of another party (coded 1),
and those who have previously been or currently are members of another
party (coded 2). What factors incline individuals to the former rather than
the latter category? We test a number of possibilities here.
The first thing we test for is the degree of ideological radicalism. The sup-
position here is that the sort of people most likely to feel strongly enough to
ditch membership of one party for another would have to be motivated by
particularly intense political attitudes. Consequently, we enter two variables
which distinguish ideological radicals from moderates, one relating to left-
right ideology and the other to libertarian-authoritarian values. Empirically,
“radicals” on each of these dimensions are defined as anyone lying more
than one standard deviation from the mean; the overall sample mean on
the Left-Right scale lies at 2.89 (where 0 = far left and 10 = far right), while
the standard deviation is 2.48. Thus, radicals on this dimension are deemed
to be those scoring less than 0.41 or more than 5.37, and they constitute
exactly 33.5% of the sample. The sample mean on the Liberty-Authority
scale is 4.78 (0 = very liberal, 10 = very authoritarian), and the standard
Table 3. Binomial logistic regression model of party switching.
B SE Sig Exp(B)
Radical_Left-right (Reference: Radical) .131 .071 .066 1.140
Radical_Liberty-Authority (Reference: Radical) -.225 .065 .000 .799
Post-materialism (Reference: Post-materialist) .400
Materialist -.136 .125 .277 .873
Mixed .017 .073 .815 1.017
Vote 2016 EU referendum (Reference: Did not vote) .002
Remain .321 .193 .097 1.378
Leave .650 .212 .002 1.915
Campaign Activity Scale (0=no activity, 9=maximum activity) .056 .018 .002 1.057
Social Grade (Reference: C2DE) .208 .080 .009 1.232
Graduate (Reference: Graduate) -.181 .068 .008 .834
Gender (Reference: Female) .288 .066 .000 1.333
Age (in years) .005 .002 .025 1.005
Party_Membership (Reference: SNP) .000
Conservative -.456 .148 .002 .634
Labour -.343 .118 .004 .710
Liberal Democrat .232 .115 .044 1.261
Brexit Party .535 .148 .000 1.707
Green .595 .114 .000 1.813
Constant −2.295 .257 .000 .101
Notes: Dependent variable: Formerly a member of another party? 1=No, 2=Yes. Cox-Snell R2 = .046,
Nagelkerke R2 = .069, correctly predicted cases = 76.3%; n = 6013. Source: Party Members Project
Survey 2019.
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deviation is 2.65. Therefore, radicals on this dimension are defined as people
scoring less than 2.13 or more than 7.43, and constitute 43% of the sample.
Simple bivariate analysis suggests, contra expectations, that it is moder-
ates rather than radicals on the Left-Right scale who are more likely to
claim other party memberships (by 24.5% to 21.5%, p = .006). However, on
the Liberal-Authoritarian scale the reverse is the case, as radicals are more
likely to have or have had other party memberships (by 27% to 21%, p
= .000). When we examine the logistic regression model, we find that the
latter effect is significant and signed as expected, after controlling for all of
the other terms in the model: those who are especially liberal or authoritarian
are indeed more likely to be party-switchers. However, left-right radicalism
has the opposite sign and is not significant (unless one accepts p < .10).
We also test the effects of two other major values divides might have had
on party-switching – post-materialism and Brexit. Both of these are important
attitudinal dimensions of contemporary British politics. While attitude
towards Brexit is known to be related to the liberty-authority dimension
(Sobolewska and Ford 2020), it is not perfectly correlated with it. Post-materi-
alism is, of course, a long-recognized attitudinal dimension which is also not
simply reducible to either left-right or liberty-authority positions (Hooghe,
Marks, and Wilson 2002; Webb and Bale 2021, Tables 6.1 and 6.2). It therefore
seems important to account for their possible impact as possible ideological
drivers in their own right. As it happens, however, post-materialism is not sig-
nificant in the model, even though simple bivariate analysis does suggest a
modest difference between ideological materialists (19.1% of whom are
party-switchers) and post-materialists (24.8% of whom are switchers). Even
though this difference is statistically significant in a crosstabulation (p
= .012), the effect loses impact in the context of the multivariate model.
Brexit, on the other hand, does prove to be a significant factor, which is
hardly surprising given all that it has meant for British politics over the past
few years. It is widely recognized that this has become an important dividing
line in the politics of the UK since 2016, with the capacity to realign patterns
of political support (Fieldhouse et al. 2019, ch.9; Sobolewska and Ford 2020).
A simple crosstabulation shows that those who voted Leave in the 2016 refer-
endum on EUmembership were more likely than those who favoured Remain
to have switched party membership at some point (by 27.1% to 21.9%, p
= .000). This effect remains significant (p < .005) in the multivariate model.
This may, of course, turn out to be a period effect – something that could
be tested in a replication study in a few years’ time.
The model also takes into account the level of activism of party members.
In previous work, we have found that those members most engaged in
activity on behalf of their parties are generally less likely to quit (Bale,
Webb, and Poletti 2019, 162). Here, however, we uncover a rather different,
though not mutually incompatible, finding: even though more active
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members are less likely to leave a party in the first place, if they do so, it seems
that they are then more likely to go on and join another party. We test this
with a variable which registers the mean number of activities they undertook
on behalf of their current party in the 2019 election campaign: this scale runs
from 0 to 9 (mean = 1.75). In the model, the higher a respondent’s score on
this scale, the more likely they are to have or have had other party member-
ships (p = .001).
Finally, we proceed to test for the impact of a number of demographic and
party affiliation variables, most of which prove to be significant in the model.
The inclusion of these standard control variables is for exploratory rather than
a priori theoretical reasons. Non-manual ABC1 respondents prove to be more
likely to switch parties than manual C2DEs: in a simple bivariate cross-tabula-
tion the respective shares who have switched are 24.3% and 20.3% (p = .001),
and this remains significant (p = .009) in the multivariate model. The differ-
ence between graduates and non-graduates is also significant in the model
(p = .004), with the latter being less likely to have had more than one party
membership. Bivariate cross-tabulation suggests that men are more likely
to be party-switchers than women (by 25.6% to 20.0%), and this effect is
confirmed in the multivariate model; compared to women, men are signifi-
cantly more likely to be switchers (p = .000). Age is also significant: the
older a respondent is, the more likely he or she is to have had other party
affiliations (p = .016); presumably, the longer one has been around, the
more opportunity one has had to experience the vicissitudes of political
life and to have reconsidered one’s own position and allegiance.
Lastly, we have to take account of and control for party affiliations. These
are mostly significant. The reference category is SNP membership, and the
picture that emerges from this is that members of the two largest parties
are significantly less likely than SNP members to have switched parties,
while the current members of the smaller parties are all more likely to
include switchers. The exact bivariate picture is evident in Table 1 above.
Conclusion
Our research suggests that there are several factors which make members, at
least in contemporary Britain, more likely to switch parties: being especially
socially liberal or socially authoritarian; being a Brexiteer; being a campaign
activist; working in non-manual occupation; having a university degree;
being a man rather than a woman; being older rather than younger; and
being a current member of one of the country’s smaller political parties.
Our research also reveals that party switching at the grassroots occurs far
more frequently among rank and file members than it does among MPs –
not surprisingly, perhaps, given the much higher sunk costs and reputational
and career risks faced by the latter. That said, it is not sufficiently widespread
JOURNAL OF ELECTIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTIES 9
to support claims of entryism into either of Britain’s twomain parties – at least
on the sort of scale that might account for their recent positional shifts.
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